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DATA AND METHOD
Although they share a common scholarly purpose, meta-analyses (MAs) and literature reviews (LRs) are quite different from each other. LRs examine how a particular phenomenon has been studied by scholars in published works with the objective of justifying the need for further research. MAs deal with specific empirical hypotheses and try to tell something about them with the objective of assessing, on the basis of the empirical work so far published, whether there is an impact of some independent variable upon some dependent variable, and, if so, what the amplitude of this impact is. Therefore LRs are about "studies", MAs are about parameter estimates: LR gathers information about various studies in order to describe and compare them;
MA extracts from these studies all the relevant parameter estimates together with information about them. Furthermore LR limits itself to the most important studies in a given field whereas MA tends towards comprehensiveness.
There is a plethora of LRs in the partisan theory literature. Typically almost every partisan theory study, theoretical or empirical, contains a literature review putting the issue in context. Some LRs however stand out as especially illuminating. Blais, Blake and Dion's (1993) review is one of them, as is Caramani and Hug's (1998) . On the other hand, MA is much less frequent. The only two meta-analyses of partisan theory that we are aware of are Imbeau (1994) who presented a preliminary analysis on a subset of our database, and Schmidt (1996) . The purpose of this essay is to expand on the work of Imbeau and Schmidt by systematically assessing the predictive performance of empirical tests of partisan impact that have been reported in the cross-national partisan theory literature since 1976. How often do these tests confirm the partisan theory hypothesis? What (if any) are the main determinants of statistical support for the left-right partisan influence hypothesis? More specifically, are partisan cycle explanations more sensitive 7 to substantive policy domains or to issues of methods and measurement? How do our results contribute to the advancement of knowledge in the field? Can we discern a tendency toward scientific aggregation (defined in terms of increasing success rates) in the literature over the past two decades?
Like any other empirical research, MAs are vulnerable to various threats to validity (Campbell and Stanley, 1963) . The main threat to validity in this MA is heterogeneity among the studies incorporated in the analysis. We tried to respond to this threat to validity with two kinds of appropriate actions: first by establishing explicit criteria for the selection of individual studies in order to insure that the tests within each study are comparable; and second, by coding relevant published information in the form of variables most susceptible of influencing the predictive performance of each test. The criteria for the selection of cases and the rules for constructing the variables in the MA were organised in a codebook which served as guideline for coders to review each study in view of identifying individual parameter estimates and their relevant attributes.
Routine and less routine controls were applied in order to insure inter-coder reliability. Among others, a special software with limited data field size was elaborated to help data collection and minimise coding errors. At the end of the coding process, the principal investigator doublechecked all coding and any coder-investigator disagreement were discussed and consensually solved though such disagreements were relatively rare and of minor importance.
Selection of cases
One concern in selecting individual cases for the meta-analysis was comprehensiveness. To have confidence in our measures, we needed to be sure that the selection process was representative of the available material. To achieve this goal, we tried to minimize discretion in selection; we, therefore, considered everything that we could find in the published record. Accordingly, we searched the literature for studies containing empirical tests of the partisan cycle hypothesis.
Through a conventional bibliographic search starting with the most widely cited works in the field and applying cross-referencing techniques to identify additional relevant studies, and through an on-line search of the most important bibliographic search tools in social sciences including Bartolini's impressive database on 11,500 publications on European parties and party systems since 1945 (Bartolini, Caramani and Hug 1998) , we identified over 600 studies (mainly journal articles and book chapters) containing empirical results relevant to our problem.
Next, it was decided that the countries selected for analysis should all share similar democratic institutional arrangements and traditions. This is justified on theoretical grounds since partisan theory is explicitly applicable only to democratic systems (Hibbs 1992) . Our choice appears sensible methodologically since sample heterogeneity in terms of democratic characteristics would certainly threaten the validity of our comparison of parameter estimates.
We, therefore, limited our analysis to empirical test results in OECD countries.
Empirical tests of partisan theory come either in the form of longitudinal studies or in the form of cross-sectional studies. Longitudinal studies examine the variations in partisan impact over time within the same country. Cross-sectional studies, on the other hand, compare more than one countries. In this MA, we are primarily interested in reporting cross-national comparisons. This is why the analysis only includes results from cross-sectional studies and times-series cross-sectional studies.
Another consideration was to achieve a degree of sample homogeneity in the policy (dependent) variables examined in individual studies. To be valid, a comparison of parameter estimates should be based on similar dependent variables. Because of the wide variety of measures of the policy variable in the partisan theory literature, it is impossible completely to prevent any departure from perfect homogeneity. To insure comparability of the dependent variables, we decided that the parameter estimates in the individual studies under analysis should be related to a measure of policy outputs like spending, taxation, legislation or regulation. We thus excluded statistical tests on macroeconomic outcomes such as growth, unemployment and inflation. This choice is justified on the theoretical ground that macroeconomic outcomes are much less susceptible of manipulation by governments than policy outputs.
The validity of the meta-analysis may also be threatened by the wide variety of measures of the party ideology (independent) variables that are used by partisan theorists to explain policy outputs in individual studies. To limit heterogeneity in the party ideology variables, we consider only tests in which the variables' attributes are defined as either left or right. We therefore leave out tests that report specifically the impact of centre (mostly Christian-democratic) and green parties on policy outputs. Following Downs (1957) virtually all studies in the partisan theory literature assume that party positioning can be ordered on a left-right scale corresponding to the desired degree of government intervention in the economy (the left supports a higher level-and the right supports a lower level--of government intervention). The issue of whether the space of party competition can be reduced to one dimension has been the object of considerable theoretical debate (Sartori 1976; Laponce 1981) . The left-right dichotomy has also been criticised recently on the ground that it ignores the distinctive character of Christian democracy (van Kersbergen 1995) . However, it is clear that the distinction between the left and the right continues to dominate party competition and voters' perception in advanced liberal democracies (Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987; Lewis-Beck 1988; Klingemann et al. 1994 ).
Another possible threat to validity in MA is the lack of sample homogeneity in the estimation methods. One of the objective of this MA is to extract overall measures of the relationship between the party composition of government and policy outputs from single coefficients found in individual studies. Ideally, the individual coefficients to be compared should be highly similar to one another. This is not the case here given the wide variety of statistical measures of association used by partisan theorists in their empirical tests. We decided to cast a wide net by including both bivariate and multivariate correlation and regression coefficients in the MA. Correlation coefficients are based on standardized values (standard deviations) and therefore directly comparable across individual studies. However, unstandardized regression coefficient estimates are not directly comparable, since their weights directly mirror the scale that is used to measure the variables in each individual study. Including both correlation and regression coefficients in the sample therefore prevents us from comparing the actual values of the parameter estimates in the meta-analysis. But we can still compare the statistical significance and the direction of correlation and regression estimates, something we cannot do with the results based on other statistical techniques.
Variables in the meta-analysis
The dependent variable in the MA is the predictive performance of individual tests of partisan theory, measured on the basis of parameter estimates of party impact. These estimates are operationalized in terms of three attributes: estimates that support the partisan theory hypothesis (the coefficient is significant and in the predicted direction) are recorded as "successes";
estimates that fail to confirm the hypothesis (the coefficient fails the test of statistical significance) are reported as "failures"; estimates that contradict the hypothesis (the coefficient is significant and in the wrong direction) are reported as "anomalies". Of course, comparing the relative predictive performance of individual tests cannot be assessed in a vacuum. To settle the question, one needs to look at possible sources of variation in predictive performance across cases.
Individual tests of the partisan theory hypothesis vary first and foremost in the definition and operationalization of policy outputs (the dependent variable in these tests). The definitions of policy outputs raises important theoretical debates with regard to 1) whether partisan impact varies depending on the policy domain, and 2) whether policy outputs should be measured on the basis of financial data such as taxation and public expenditures or on the basis of non financial data such as regulation and public employment.
A large number of cross-national tests of partisan theory examine party impact on the development of the welfare state. Sociological theories of cross-national convergence argue that industrialized countries experience similar welfare states as a direct result of their similar levels of economic wealth and technological development (Wilensky 1976) . It is, therefore, no coincidence that partisan theorists have paid special attention to welfare policies (i.e., health, (Hibbs, 1977 (Hibbs, , 1992 Tufte, 1978) . The hypothesis states that the standard relationship Individual tests of partisan theory also vary in terms of how they operationalize observed government activity. Most studies operationalize government activity in terms of public spending or revenues from taxes (often expressed as a percentage of GDP). This is justified on grounds of availability of the data (financial data are standardized in such a way as to make possible crossnational comparisons). However, the use of financial data has been criticized for failing to capture important dimensions of policy outputs. For example, it has been argued that, instead of focusing only on public expenditures as a measure of welfare effort, analysts should also consider various policy instruments (such as guaranteed basic income or conditional benefits) from which government can choose to affect income distribution in society (Esping-Andersen 1990). Others argue that, although financial data may constitute valid indicators of government priorities among 13 capital intensive programs that compete for scarce resources, they provide less valid measures of government activity in other, less capital intensive policy domains. Several empirical studies in the partisan theory literature have focused on state regulatory activity such as international agreements (Keman 1982) , tariffs in the manufacturing sector (Blais 1986 ), or macro-economic policy (Pennings 1995) . Other studies have been concerned with administrative aspects such as government employment (Cusack, Notermans and Rein 1989) or state privatisation strategy (Boix 1997) .
In order to assess the impact of variation in the definition of policy domains on our conclusions, we record whether individual parameter estimates apply to social welfare policies, the size of the state, economic policies, or foreign and defence policies. We also record whether the measure of government activity in each test is based on financial data (e.g., public spending) or on non financial data (e.g., regulation or administrative action).
Individual tests of the partisan theory hypothesis offer a wide variety of measures of the party composition of government (the main explanatory variable in these tests). Individual authors' definitions of the party composition of government vary depending on 1) whether they report the presence of the left or the right in government; 2) what parties (or families of parties) are included in the measure, and 3) how the measure accounts for relative party strength.
Existing approaches in regard to the left-right measure of the party composition of government fall into two basic traditions. The most frequently used approach consists of reporting the presence of the left in government (Tufte 1978; Hibbs 1977 and 1992; Cameron 1978) . A theoretical justification for choosing this particular approach is given by EspingAndersen (1990) who argues that the presence or absence of a leftist tendency is the most important political determinant of welfare expansion in capitalist democracies. The other approach reports the presence of the right in government. Castles (1982) argues that the presence or absence of the right makes the most important difference in public policy, especially social policy.
Individual authors often calculate the presence of the left or the right in government in the form of sophisticated indices that may or may not take into account the full partisan spectrum.
There is some disagreement about the range of parties to be included in the measure. Most studies examined in this MA report the presence of the left and/or the right in government on the basis of either leftist parties, a left-right scale, Conservative parties, or major parties of the right. These four measures are highly correlated with each other (Schmidt 1996 : 161) so we can be confident Individual measures of the party composition of government also differ in their definitions of relative party strength. The most frequently used measure is the party composition of cabinet. This is justified on two grounds: 1) that, in advanced liberal democracies, political power is basically exercised through the cabinet and 2) that governmental policy is directly related to the allocation of ministerial portfolios among different parties (Austen-Smith and Banks 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1994) . Another indicator of relative party strength is the percentage of parliamentary seats among the parties forming the cabinet. Blais, Blake and Dion (1993) argue that since "the basic decision-making unit is the cabinet, an assumption that underlies the whole approach, surely the most logical indicator is the percentage of cabinet posts held by the parties of various stripes " (1993: 50) . In any case, since cabinet seats tend to be directly proportional to parliamentary seats (Browne and Franklin 1973) we should expect little difference in the results achieved by each measure.
On the other hand, a case can be made in support of measuring the party composition of government in terms of the percentage of popular votes. A government's popular vote is a good measure of its electoral vulnerability: a government that enjoys little popular support is likely to be more vulnerable and, therefore, more inclined to retreat from its ideological ideal in order to court voters from an opposing coalition.
In order to control for the variation in individual definitions and operationalizations of the party composition of government in the MA, we collected and coded information about which party or family of parties (right or left) and which indicators of party strength (popular votes, seats in parliament, ministerial portfolios) were used as measures of the party composition of government in individual tests.
In spite of all the restrictive conditions that were applied to insure sample homogeneity, there remains quite an important variation among the cases in the sample. This remaining variation still represents a threat to the validity of our meta-analysis. We address this problem by incorporating additional variables in the meta-analysis. First, we coded information about the period of analysis in each individual study so that any time effect on the results could be taken into account. This information was used to construct a historical period variable with two attributes, one for test results partly or entirely based on post-1973 annual observations, the other for test results entirely based on data up to (and including) the year 1973.
ii We also considered the effect of variation in sample size (N) on parameter estimates. Indeed levels of significance being very sensitive to sample size, it is not uncommon to find significant correlations when N is very large. This may happen more and more in the body of research we are considering as researchers increasingly tend to use time-series cross-section designs, thus sensibly increasing sample size. In order to protect our conclusions from variations in sample size, we coded each parameter estimate for the corresponding value of N and took that information into account to construct a sample size variable. Another factor that may affect the validity of our meta-analysis is the variation in the specification of the model in each individual study, i.e. the number and nature of political explanations that are included in each model in addition to the party composition of government variable. There is evidence that the statistical significance and the direction of estimates of partisan impact may be affected by factors such as the division of power between parties in and out of government (Blais, Blake and Dion 1993 and , the frequency of electoral competition and the degree of openness of the national economy (Cameron 1978) , or the time a government has been in power (Swank 1988; Blais, Blake and Dion 1993; Thérien and Noël 2000) .
iii Unfortunately, these (and other) potentially confounding factors have not been consistently examined in the literature. The small number of available estimates associated with each explanation preclude their inclusion in the MA. On the other hand, we can still record the variation in model specifications with a dichotomous variable which identifies whether the estimation is bivariate or multivariate.
FINDINGS
Out of over 600 studies identified in the bibliographic search, 43 proved to correspond to our selection criteria. The studies are listed in chronological order in Table 1 along with information about the period and the number of countries over which the tests were run, the relevant policy domain, and the left-right attribute used to define the party composition of government variable.
The earliest study is the one by Wilensky (1976) vi Second, the number of successes that we report must be considered in relation to the number of anomalies. Supporters of the "politics matter" school of thought should take heart at our finding that "successes" beat "anomalies" in the ratio of 3 to 1. Last but not least, the number of successes that we report depends in no small part on the well-established practice among partisan theorists of reporting insignificant or anomalous test results based on the "wrong" approach to bolster a contrario their own (obviously successful) approach. vii But we had no choice but to include all the tests that satisfy our selection criteria in the MA whatever the intention of individual authors in reporting those tests. In any case, our research questions will not be settled by just looking at overall success rates. We need to look instead for explanatory variables that reveal something theoretically interesting about possible sources of variation in the predictive performance of models of left-right partisan impact. successes (6%) out of 96 tests in the economic policy domain. The deviations from the mean success rate are statistically significant in both the foreign affairs and the economic policy domains. In particular, the predictive performance of tests in the economic policy domain is highly contrasted. Tests of left-right party impact on the level of state intervention in the economy have a (relatively) very high degree of success (39%). On the other hand, the success rate in the public budget and taxation areas is virtually zero. We see from Table 3 that there are twice as many tests based on the presence of the left (472) as compared with tests based on the presence of the right (221) in our sample. Tests that report the presence of the right generate a higher rate of success on average (25%) than tests that report the presence of the left (21%). However, the paired difference is too small to be statistically significant. Looking at the party strength variable of Table 3 , we see that using the percent of cabinet portfolios, although the preferred method of calculating party strength, has no statistical impact on success when compared with alternative methods. Table 5 . It appears that the additive and the interaction multivariate findings of Table 5 are sufficiently robust to allow a more general discussion.
OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION
This meta-analysis examines 693 published cross-section estimates of left-right party impact on policy in OECD countries. We find that 154 (22%) estimates support the left-right partisan theory hypothesis, 48 (7%) estimates contradict the hypothesis, and 491 (71%) estimates fail to support the hypothesis, although most of them are in the correct direction.
We started this research with a series of questions that have not been addressed in the meta-analytic format before: What (if any) are the determinants of variations in statistical support? Are partisan cycle explanations more sensitive to the policy domain of government intervention or to issues of measurement and methodology? Can we discern a tendency toward scientific aggregation (operationalized as increasing success rate over time) in the partisan theory literature?
In response to the first two questions, we find from the additive multivariate model of Table 5 , that three variables are of major importance for success in empirical tests of left-right partisan theory. Success occurs more frequently with multivariate tests, with measures of the size of the state as opposed to measures based on specific policy domains (especially foreign affairs and the economy), and with post-1973 data. We also find that success is weakly correlated with the definition of party strength in terms of popular votes (this last result is not entirely robust however). On the other hand, the variables for financial government activity, left-right party ideology, and sample size all fail the statistical significance test in the additive multivariate model of Table 5 . The absence of statistical impact of the sample size variable on success appears to contradict the notion that left-right partisan effects are virtually always present but that their magnitude is so small that they can only be detected with large samples.
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The data also suggest that the extent to which the left-right partisan divide influences policy depends much more on the policy domain than on the measurement of the party composition of government. However, this conclusion must be qualified in the light of one important caveat. We do not take centre parties into account in our definition of the party composition of government. Centre parties have been shown to influence policy in a distinctive and coherent way. Christian-democratic parties in particular have proposed their own brand of solutions with respect to social welfare (van Kersbergen 1995) and foreign aid (Thérien and Noël 2000) . Therefore, including centre parties in our design would most likely alter some of our conclusions.
In response to the third question, we find from the additive model of Table 5 Table 5 show, the effect of the variables for the size of the state and the post-1973 period is not only additive; these variables also have a highly significant interaction effect on success. By contrast the predictive performance of tests in other policy domains does not appear to be affected by the historical period of analysis.
From Table 4 , we see that the size of the state has become a significantly more salient Table 4 is compatible with the view that more and more government growth scholars have incorporated partisan variables in their models. While plausible, this explanation however fails to account for the relatively low number of tests of welfare spending in the post-1973 period.
The statistical evidence of Model 2 in Table 5 characterized by lower rates of growth, higher inflation and unemployment and increased leftright conflict over the appropriate size of the public sector (Peters 1990; Przeworski and Wallerstein 1982) . One might hypothesize that, as the substantive stakes of left-right party rivalry shifted away from social welfare and toward the overall size of the public sector, scholars in the partisan theory literature have tended to take this substantive change into account in their work and to switch their focus of attention accordingly. 
ENDNOTES
i By accumulation we mean that we have a large literature (with publications numbering in the hundreds) which does have a readily understandable theoretical point of reference and which is of high quality. Aggregation makes the additional requirements of scientific coherence and directionality (or complementarity) within an expanding literature (McKinlay 1996) .
ii The cutting date (1973) coincides with the onset of a major recession in industrialized countries. It is also used in studies that compare government growth over different periods (Swank, 1988) .
iii Party system polarisation provides an opportunity for partisan influence. High interparty policy distance makes it more likely that a newly elected government will overturn the policies that were put in place by the preceding government in favour of the policies proposed by the winner. The division of labour between parties in and out of government also affects partisan influence. Majoritarian governments have more room of manoeuvre and are, therefore, more likely to influence policy outputs than minority or divided governemnts. It is also possible that electoral manipulation may interfere and dampen partisan influence. Another possibility is that newly elected governments are less likely to influence policy outputs than reelected governments.
iv Recent studies by Clayton and Pontusson (1998) , Garrett (1998), Midtbø (1999) estimates of left-right party impact in order to prove their point that statistically significant estimates exist in association with centre parties.
viii There were too few anomaly cases to include them as a distinct variable in this
analysis.
ix We also tested for a possible "fashion effect" by including the year of publication as an additional control. The coefficient was negative but not significant. The year of publication of an estimate does not affect its predictive performance.
